This paper investigates the link between mortgage supply shocks at the banklevel and regional house price growth in the U.S. using micro-level data on mortgage markets from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for the 1990-2014 period. Our results suggest that bank-specific mortgage supply shocks indeed affect house price growth at the regional level. The larger the idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages, the stronger is house price growth. We show that the positive link between idiosyncratic mortgage shocks and regional house price growth is very robust and economically meaningful, however not very persistent since it fades out after two years.
Motivation
Building on the concept of granularity (Gabaix, 2011) , this paper investigates the role of micro-level mortgage supply shocks for aggregate house price growth across U.S. regions.
The idea is that bank-specific shocks to mortgage origination can impact macroeconomic variables if concentration in the mortgage market is very high. If a few large mortgage lenders dominate the market, diversification effects are dampened, such that idiosyncratic lending shocks can lead to movements in aggregate mortgage supply and house prices.
Indeed, mortgage market concentration has increased substantially since the 1990s.
While the top 1% of U.S. banks supplied 50% of mortgages in 1991, they accounted for almost 80% of total mortgages in 2007. In addition, Figure 1 illustrates that mortgage lending accounts for an increasing fraction of the overall credit business: while mortgages made up for less than one quarter of total loans in the U.S. at the beginning of the 1990s, the ratio of mortgages to total loans has significantly increased during the run-up to the financial crisis. In 2010, it stood at roughly 45%. Regarding the macroeconomic consequences of these developments, the literature shows that mortgage lending is an important driver of macroeconomic vulnerabilities (Jorda et al., 2016) .
While several previous studies focus on the role of aggregate credit for house prices and macroeconomic performance, our analysis extends the literature by shifting the focus toward bank-specific, granular effects. Given that risk at the level of individual financial institutions can harm aggregate economic stability, this paper asks whether idiosyncratic changes in the mortgage supply of large banks impact house price growth and, hence, macroeconomic performance. It thus aims at shedding light on how sensitive the U.S.
housing market reacts to idiosyncratic credit supply shocks.
We analyze the nexus of bank-specific mortgage supply shocks and house price dynamics in U.S. regions in two steps. First, we examine if the degree of concentration in the market for newly issued mortgages is high enough for granular effects on regional house prices.
Second, we investigate whether and how bank-specific mortgage supply shocks drive house price movements at the regional level.
At first glance, idiosyncratic shocks should not matter for aggregate outcomes. Bankspecific events, including financial innovations, fine payments, computer glitches, and unexpected managerial decisions, should not have any far-reaching power beyond the microlevel in an economy with a large number of firms and banks, like the United States. If firm sizes were normally distributed, the law of large numbers would smooth out the impact of idiosyncratic shocks, ultimately showing negligible effects on aggregate variables. However, if markets are highly concentrated, as they are in manufacturing (Di Giovanni et al., 2011) and especially in banking (Bremus et al., 2013) , such diversification effects are dampened. Gabaix (2011) demonstrates, both theoretically and empirically, that a fat-tailed power law distribution of firm sizes implies a significant role of idiosyncratic, firm-level shocks for aggregate volatility. Intuitively, idiosyncratic fluctuations of the sales of Nokia cannot be easily counteracted by other firms, exposing Finland's economic activity to the fates of one big market player. Gabaix (2011) labels this phenomenon as "Granularity" and presents evidence that firm-specific shocks hitting the largest manufacturing firms in the U.S. explain one-third of aggregate output fluctuations.
We apply the the concept of granularity to the U.S. financial market. Our analysis of granular mortgage market effects yields four important findings. First, we provide evidence that the mortgage market is highly concentrated at the level of U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). Estimations of the power law coefficient of the regional distributions of new mortgages show that mortgage size follows a power-law with a fat right tail in all MSAs.
Thereby, we can show that the necessary condition for granular effects to emerge from the mortgage market is fulfilled at our level of analysis, the MSA-level.
Second, our estimation results reveal a positive and statistically significant link between idiosyncratic shocks to newly issued mortgages and regional house price growth. This result is in line with previous findings from the granularity-literature and confirms that credit shocks at the micro-level can translate into aggregate movements. The larger that the shocks to mortgage lending at the bank-level are, the greater is house price growth.
Hence, the presence of large mortgage lenders amplifies the effects of idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks compared to less concentrated markets. Our findings are not only robust to alternative model specifications, but also to an instrumental variable (IV) approach where our measure of mortgage supply shocks is instrumented by a branching deregulation event in the U.S. banking market Third, the effect of bank-specific shocks to mortgage origination on house prices depends on the elasticity of housing supply. The more inelastic housing supply is, the more do micro-level mortgage supply shocks drive house prices. Intuitively, in regions where the extension of housing supply is limited, e.g., for geographical reasons, a positive housing demand shock triggered by easier mortgage supply drives up house prices more than in regions where housing supply can be extended more easily.
And fourth, based on a conservative IV-setting, we find that the positive effects of idiosyncratic mortgage shocks on house price growth fade out after two years. In light of the literature showing that common shocks affect house prices over a period of five years (Favara and Imbs, 2015) , these shorter-lived effects of idiosyncratic shocks in mortgage origination seem reasonable.
Our identification strategy rests on three features. First, micro-level data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) on mortgage applications enable us to employ information on newly issued mortgages, whereas the bank balance sheet data used in several previous studies just provide outstanding stocks of loans, from which newly issued loans can only be proxied. Second, the HMDA data allow for assigning mortgages to the region they are supplied to, such that bank-specific shocks can be precisely linked to the region they affect. We aggregate each bank's mortgage supply at the level of MSAs. Since the banks in our sample lend to multiple regions, we can follow the identification strategy by Khwaja and Mian (2008) to reduce concerns that our shock measure is plagued by regional demand factors. Third, to reduce any remaining concerns on reverse causality or omitted variable bias, we instrument our micro-level shock measure by a variable indicating U.S. branching deregulation. Thus, we can significantly increase the internal validity of the estimation of granular effects from the banking sector.
To put the contribution of our results into perspective, note that standard asset pricing literature suggests that house prices should equal the sum of expected income payoffs from renting a house (Allen and Gale, 2007) . Hence, the price of housing assets should depend only on their expected return, regardless of how the asset purchase is financed. 1 Yet, the literature underlines that cheaper credit is one of the main factors driving house price increases: In a theoretical paper, Justiniano et al. (2015) show that empirical features of the housing boom can be best explained by looser lending constraints in the mortgage market, not by borrowing constraints. Empirical evidence by Adelino et al. (2012) reveals that easier credit supply positively affects house prices. Mian and Sufi (2009) show that securitization led to an extension in subprime mortgages and, finally, to increased house price growth over the 2002-2005 period. In a similar vein, Di Maggio and Kermani (2016) find that U.S. counties with greater mortgage origination have seen higher house price increases in booms, and steeper house price reductions during busts. Based on U.S. branching deregulation as an instrument for credit growth, empirical findings by Favara and Imbs (2015) support that access to credit is an important driver of house prices -both in statistical and economical senses.
-Insert Figure 1 hereRegarding the macroeconomic consequences of movements in mortgage supply and house prices, based on historical credit data, Jorda et al. (2016) highlight that the importance of mortgage credit in financial sector activity has significantly increased over time, so that banks and households have levered up substantially. They identify mortgage booms as one important reason for financial as well as real fluctuations. Loutskina and Strahan (2015) show that financial integration within the U.S. has led to a closer link between house price developments and the real economy. The amplified effect of collateral shocks on the real economy has increased macroeconomic volatility. According to the household balance sheet view of Mian and Sufi (2014) , macroeconomic performance in the U.S. crucially depends on household debt dynamics. The evolution of household debt, in turn, is linked to house prices: the larger the growth in house prices, and hence in home equity, the more that leverage builds up in the household sector, such that default risk rises. In case of a sudden drop in house prices, households have to deleverage, which depresses private consumption and, hence, aggregate demand. Thus, linkages between the credit market and house prices appear to be a crucial determinant of macroeconomic performance.
Consequently, our question of whether idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks matter for house price developments in concentrated mortgage markets is important for the regulatory debate over micro-and macroprudential policies.
Our study is most closely related to the literature on granular origins of aggregate fluctuations in the banking sector. Blank et al. (2009) were the first to measure granular effects from banking to investigate how bank concentration affects the stability of the Ger-man banking system. Using a panel of Eastern European countries, Buch and Neugebauer (2011) find significant effects of idiosyncratic shocks to large banks on the real economy.
Using a linked bank-firm level data set, Amiti and Weinstein (2016) demonstrate that idiosyncratic credit supply shocks explain about 40% of aggregate loan and investment fluctuations in Japan. Bremus et al. (2013) provide a general equilibrium model of granular effects from the credit market and find empirical support that bank-specific credit shocks affect the macroeconomy in a large set of countries.
For the large and well diversified U.S. economy, the evidence on granular effects from the banking sector is so far very limited. One exception is the study by Landier et al. (2016) , who demonstrate that -due to high concentration and hence granular effects -financial integration is an important driver of the increased synchronization of house prices across U.S. states. We add to this literature by studying how market structure in the U.S. mortgage market affects economic performance in terms of regional house price developments.
The following section presents the data and our empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the estimation results, while Section 4 concludes.
Data and Methodology
In order to test whether bank-specific mortgage supply shocks affect house price movements at the regional level, we proceed in three steps. First, we calculate idiosyncratic shocks to mortgage supply. Second, a measure of granular effects from the regional mortgage market is constructed using banks' regional mortgage market shares. We then regress regional house price growth on this measure of granular effects from the mortgage market.
Granular Effects from the Mortgage Market
Intuitively, the idea behind granular effects from the mortgage market is that idiosyncratic shocks matter for aggregate house prices if concentration is high enough. If the market shares of the players in the credit market are relatively equal, then idiosyncratic shocks cancel out across a large number of banks. Yet, when concentration is high, such that the largest players dominate the market, they can contribute to aggregate movements in house prices. 2
Concentration in mortgage origination
Before testing whether bank-specific mortgage supply shocks affect house price growth in U.S. regions, we have to check whether the necessary condition for granular effects from the mortgage market is fulfilled. To that goal, the dispersion of the distribution of newly issued mortgages has to be high enough, such that idiosyncratic shocks do not cancel out across a large number of mortgage suppliers. A first look at the data reveals that U.S. mortgage origination is indeed dominated by large banks. Figure 2 reports mortgage origination activity of the largest banks as a fraction of total mortgage origination. For example, mortgage origination of the top 1% of banks is almost 80% of overall lending in 2007, with the top 0.1% of banks accounting for more than 40% of total mortgage activity in 2010, hinting at a high degree of mortgage market concentration.
-Insert Figure 2 hereSince granular effects can emerge only if mortgage origination is extremely concentrated, we must test whether the distribution of newly issued mortgages follows a fat-tailed power law (Gabaix (2011) , Proposition 2). 3 This is the case if the power law coefficient of the distribution is less than one.
Following Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) , we estimate the dispersion parameter of the size distribution of newly issued mortgages for each MSA using the following regression
where Rank bm is the rank of bank b's newly issued mortgages in MSA m, and N L bm is the corresponding volume of newly issued mortgages. β is the power law coefficient, i.e., the parameter of interest here.
-Insert Figure 3 here - Figure 3 illustrates the estimation results. It plots the histogram of the estimated power law coefficients for each MSA in the year 2000. All coefficients are significant at the one percent level. 4 The figure reveals that all estimates are below one (also in absolute values), meaning that the distribution of newly issued mortgages is indeed extremely dispersed with infinite variance. Thus, the distribution of new mortgages follows a fat-tailed power law in all MSAs in our sample, such that the necessary condition for granular effects from the mortgage market is fulfilled. Thereby, idiosyncratic shocks can play a role for house price growth given that concentration in mortgage origination is high enough for large banks to affect the economy.
Measuring mortgage supply shocks. Table 1 provides detailed information about our data and variable definitions.
-Insert Table 1 herepower law distributed shocks is strongly favored by the data compared to the Gaussian shock assumption using the Wouters (2005, 2007 ) DSGE model. 4 The numerical estimation results are available from the authors upon request. The HMDA data have two important advantages over bank balance sheet data that is typically used in the granularity-literature. First, they provide information about newly issued mortgages (a flow variable). In contrast, balance sheet data provide information about the stock of credits only, such that newly issued credit can only be proxied by looking at credit growth. And second, the HMDA data allow for assigning mortgages to the regions where they are supplied, something bank balance sheet data does not permit.
Exploiting the HMDA data set, we aggregate all accepted mortgage loans for each bank according to the location of the purchased property, namely by MSA. Our regression sample covers mortgages for 345 MSAs from 1990 through 2014. At least thirty banks are active per year in each MSA included in the sample (Table 2) . 5 -Insert Table 2 hereTo identify the idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks, we take a similar approach to that of Greenstone et al. (2014) and regress the natural logarithm of the volume of newly issued mortgage credits of bank b in MSA m at time t on a set of bank-, time-, and MSA-fixed
The goal is to purge bank b's new mortgages extended to MSA m from all macroeconomic and common mortgage market factors. Extracting the residual from this specification yields the bank-specific mortgage lending shock at the MSA-level. While α b purges newly issued mortgages from all time-invariant characteristics of bank b, like its general business model, β t controls for all time-varying factors that affect all MSAs, like common changes in credit, general funding conditions, and economic growth. To control for demand effects, we apply the approach proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008) and define a mortgage loan as a bank-MSA pair. Since every MSA borrows from multiple banks, including an MSA-fixed effect accounts for time-invariant differences in demand by the same MSA across the different suppliers of credit. In addition, the combined MSA-and-year fixed effects, δ mt , account for time-varying credit demand changes across regions. Thus, our shock measure is purged from MSA-specific demand changes.
The first panel of Table 2 presents summary statistics for the mortgage origination shock bmt . It reveals that even if the sample mean of bank-specific mortgage supply shocks is zero, the measure takes on negative and positive values with a standard deviation of 1.7. As shown by Equation (2), positive values present positive deviations of newly issued mortgages (by bank b to MSA m in year t) from the conditional mean due to bank-MSA-specific events like unexpected managerial decisions on credit supply. Negative values reflect negative deviations in mortgage origination, e.g., due to idiosyncratic funding shortages.
Granularity in regional mortgage markets.
To compute a measure of granular effects from the mortgage market at the MSA-level, the Banking Granular Residual (BGR),
we weigh the idiosyncratic mortgage shocks from the previous section with the respective market share of each bank in the MSA. According to the theoretical considerations by
Gabaix (2011) and Bremus et al. (2013) and following the econometric approach by
Mondragon (2015), we aggregate these weighted shocks, in our case at the MSA level
where N L bm,t−1 /N L m,t−1 is the lagged market share in mortgage origination of bank b in MSA m at year t − 1, and bmt is the contemporaneous regional mortgage supply shock of bank b. This yields our measure of granular effects from the mortgage market at the MSA level, which is available at annual frequency for the period 1990-2014. The higher concentration in an MSA or the larger mortgage supply shocks, the larger the value of the BGR becomes.
According to the concept of granularity, we expect the effect of the BGR on aggregate house price growth to be positive. If concentration in mortgage origination is high enough, the higher bank-specific shocks or concentration are -and thus the larger the BGR -the stronger should be the link to aggregate house price growth.
-Insert Figure 4 here -To visualize the regional differences of the BGR, the top panel of Figure 4 plots the 
House Price Growth and Control Variables
Our dependent variable, house price growth, is computed based on the Freddie Mac House
Price Index (FMHPI), which is available for 367 MSAs over the 1975 to 2015 period.
The FMHPI is based on an ever expanding database of loans purchased by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. It is constructed using a repeat-transactions methodology, which is an increasingly common practice in housing research (Bollerslev et al., 2016) . The FMHPI index is estimated with data including transactions on one-family and townhome properties serving as collateral on loans originated between January 1, 1975 and the end of the most recent index month. Given that the original data are published at monthly frequency, we take the median to get to annual frequency. 6
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows average house price growth for MSAs in our sample between 1994 and 2014. From this graphical inspection there is even less of an indication of a pattern for house price growth across the U.S. than for the BGRs (see top panel of Figure 4 ). In terms of house price growth, we find that the top three MSAs are in North 6 Taking the mean of monthly house prices does not change our results qualitatively or quantitatively. If anything, it only increases the significance of our results.
Carolina (Asheville), Texas (Austin-Round Rock), and Oregon (Bend-Redmond) while MSAs with the lowest house price growth in our sample are in Michigan (Ann Arbor), Massachusetts (Barnstable Town), and Connecticut (Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk).
A set of control variables at the MSA-level is included in the regression model for house price growth presented below. Following Favara and Imbs (2015) , we include per capita personal income growth, population growth, and total full-and part-time employment, as well as the first lags of all controls. These data are available for 382 MSAs from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Information on housing supply elasticities for each MSA is available from Saiz (2010) . The elasticities are based on the amount of land that can be developed in each MSAs. This is motivated by the observation that most regions where housing supply is inelastic are strongly land-constrained for topographic reasons.
Do Idiosyncratic Mortgage Supply Shocks Affect House Price Movements?
We now turn to the link between idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks and house price growth at the MSA-level. In order to analyze whether micro-level mortgage supply shocks have aggregate effects on house prices in U.S. regions, we run the following regression model
where standard errors are clustered at the MSA level. HP mt is annual house price growth computed by the log-difference of the house price index described above. To control for region-specific differences in house prices as well as common time trends that affect house prices in all MSAs, a set of regional (λ m ) and time fixed effects (γ t ) is included in each regression. BGR mt is the banking granular residual, and X mt includes a set of the time-varying MSA-specific control variables. It is well known that house prices display considerable geographic heterogeneity in the U.S. (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011) .
Such heterogeneity can arise from the demand side of the market, simply because income, demographic factors, and amenities are geographically heterogeneous (Lamont and Stein, 1999; Gyourko et al., 2013; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2007; Glaeser et al., 2008; Favara and Song, 2014) . We follow Favara and Imbs (2015) and include per capita personal income growth, population growth, and employment here.
Yet, house price developments across regions can also be the result of differences in housing supply elasticities, for instance because of local costs, land use regulation, or geographical restrictions (Gyourko and Saiz, 2006; Gyourko et al., 2008; Saiz, 2010) . To investigate how housing supply elasticities affect the link between idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks and house price growth, we include an interaction term between the BGR and the housing supply elasticity at the regional level, HSE m , such that the regression model becomes
Note that the individual effect of the housing supply elasticity is absorbed by the MSA-fixed effects λ m , given that our elasticity measure is time-invariant. Based on the analyses of Favara and Imbs (2015) , the idea is that changes in mortgage supply impact housing demand, which in turn affects house prices -and this the more so the lower is the elasticity of housing supply. Put differently, the more limited is the reaction of housing supply to changes in demand, the stronger the adjustment in prices should be. Hence, we expect β 2 to be negative.
Results
Idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks and house price growth Table 3 provides our baseline regression results. It reveals that bank-specific shocks at the MSA-level, as measured by the BGR, are positively linked to house price growth. In Column (1) we find a positive and statistically significant effect of the BGR on house price growth, meaning that positive innovations to mortgage origination at the level of individual large banks lead to higher house price growth. Vice versa, negative bank-specific mortgage supply shocks reduce house price growth. Thus, our results provide evidence for granular effects from the U.S. mortgage lending sector at the regional level. The more concentrated the mortgage market is, the easier do bank-level shocks spread across the housing market.
All control variables have the expected positive effects on house price growth: the higher income, population and employment growth is in an MSA, the higher is the demand for housing, and the higher rents tend to be. This, in turn, fosters house price growth.
Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient in column (1) reveals that an increase in the BGR by one standard deviation (0.72) leads to an increase in MSA-level house price growth by 0.7 percentage points. Put differently, variation in bank-specific mortgage supply explains about 10% of the variation in house price growth at the MSA-level. 7 Thus, the economic significance of the BGR is comparable in size to the control variables: while contemporaneous employment growth also explains about 10% of house price growth at the MSA-level, income growth matters somewhat more with a normalized beta-coefficient of 0.26.
Overall, column (1) supports the expectation that idiosyncratic changes in mortgage lending positively impact house price growth at the MSA level both in terms of statistical and economic significance. Hence, given that concentration in mortgage origination is very high, meaning that a few banks dominate the market, we conclude that idiosyncratic shocks to mortgage supply have aggregate affects at the housing market.
-Insert Table 3 hereOur result is in line with both theory and empirical research. Theoretical papers (Gabaix, 2011; Bremus et al., 2013) The elasticity of housing supply. Having established a positive link between microlevel mortgage shocks and regional house price growth on average, following the literature (Gyourko and Saiz, 2006; Gyourko et al., 2008; Saiz, 2010) , we now investigate how the housing supply elasticity affects the relation between idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks and house prices at the MSA level. Based on a standard supply-demand schedule, we expect the effect of bank-specific mortgage supply shocks to have more pronounced effects on house prices the less elastic is housing supply. To test this hypothesis, column (2) of Table 3 provides regression results for Equation (5). It shows, first, that the BGR retains its positive and statistically significant effect on house price growth. Second, the interaction effect with the housing supply elasticity is negative, as expected, and statistically significant, thus indicating that granular effects from the mortgage market on house prices are weaker the more elastic housing supply becomes. Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effect of the BGR on house price growth, conditional on the elasticity of housing supply (based on Table 3 , column (2)). It reveals that idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks affect house price growth only if housing supply is relatively inelastic, for example in regions in which supply extension is geographically limited, like in the Rocky Mountains. In contrast, in regions in which supply can react more easily to changes in housing demand, price changes resulting from idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks are weaker and eventually disappear.
-Insert Figure 5 here -
The financial crisis of 2007-09. Column (3) of Table 3 investigates how the financial crisis of 2007-09 impacts our baseline results. To alleviate concerns about crisis-driven effects, we augment Equation (4) to include a crisis dummy that equals one for the years 2007 to 2009 and zero otherwise, as well as its interaction with the BGR. The results in column (3) highlight that the crisis dummy has a negative and statistically significant effect on house price growth, which is not surprising as house prices have been depressed during the crisis years. However, the granular effect from the mortgage market, as measured by the BGR, remains intact. Furthermore, interacting the crisis dummy with the BGR reveals stronger granular effects from the mortgage market on house price growth during the crisis. That is, bank-specific mortgage supply shocks affect house price dynamics even more in times of distress.
Market concentration. As pointed out above, granular effects should be more pronounced in areas with a higher market concentration, which we investigate by expanding Equation (4) with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and its interaction with the BGR.
The HHI is based on the volume of newly issued mortgages and therefore captures concentration in mortgage origination. Indeed, column (4) of Table 3 indicates that MSAs with higher mortgage market concentration show a closer link between the BGR and house price changes. Figure 6 displays the marginal effect of the BGR on house price growth conditional on the mortgage market HHI. In accordance with column (4) of Table   3 , the marginal effect of BGR on house price growth is becoming stronger with increasing mortgage market concentration. Hence, our results seem to point in the same direction as recent findings by Akins et al. (2016) who show that U.S. states that have less competitive banking markets experienced -among others -a much higher growth in house prices before the crisis of 2007-09.
-Insert Figure 6 hereRobustness Our results are robust against different sanity checks. First, the positive link between the BGR and house price growth remains significant if we exclude all control variables or fixed effects from Equation (4). As shown in Table 4 , the positive and significant effect of the BGR on house price growth is more pronounced when we use no other timeand MSA-varying control variables but MSA and time fixed effects (columns (7) and (5)). If we include both sets of fixed effects separately and add the other control variables (columns (4) and (6)), we even find a smaller effect of the BGR than in our baseline regression with the full set of controls. This may provide evidence that the effects in our sample are affected differently by region and time fixed effects, thus making the fully-specified model that we estimate via Equation (4) most credible.
-Insert Table 4 hereIn addition, the effect of the BGR presented in column (1) of Table 3 remains intact for different shock specifications of Equation (2). As shown in the second column of Table   5 , we find a positive and significant effect of the BGR on house price growth if shocks are calculated with bank, bank-time, year, and MSA fixed effects. Given that all time varying and time constant bank-heterogeneity is "filtered" out, it is not surprising that in this specification the impact of the BGR is smallest; the idiosyncratic supply shocks just reflect the variation of mortgage supply across MSAs for each bank in this case. The most parsimonious measure of the BGR (column (3)) is based on a shock specification that includes only year, MSA and year-MSA fixed effects. It indicates the largest effect of all different specifications of the BGR. This is plausible since the variation in mortgage lending driven by (time-invariant and -variant) heterogeneity at the bank-level is contained in the shocks. Column (4) of Table 5 shows an insignificant effect of the BGR on house prices based on a lavish shock specification: bank, MSA, time, bank-time and MSA-time fixed effects. Possibly, there is too little variation left over in the shock measure and, thus, in the BGR.
-Insert Table 5 here -
Threats to Validity
One concern regarding internal validity relates to the exogeneity of the BGR. According to Flannery and Lin (2016) , it is very difficult to identify the causal effect between credit and house prices since the direction of causality could go both ways. House prices may rise in reaction to an increase in credit supply via cheaper and more plentiful mortgage lending. But house prices may also encourage further lending because higher real estate values serve as collateral and thus increase borrowing capacities.
If we identified idiosyncratic movements of mortgage lending correctly, by definition, it
is very unlikely that these idiosyncratic shocks are correlated with other confounding factors as we clean the shock measure from all MSA-time variation (δ mt ). However, we follow Favara and Imbs (2015) and address this issue with an instrumental variable approach as we cannot fully control for demand effects at the bank-household level. To instrument the BGR, we use a deregulation event in U.S. banking markets.
For the instrumental variable (IV) estimation, we make use of the fact that in the past decades, the U.S. banking sector went through regulatory changes regarding banks' geographic expansion (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999 The idea behind this instrument is that it affects the BGR via increased entry into the mortgage market, but at the same time being independent of house prices. Ex ante, we would hypothesize a negative link between deregulation and the Banking Granular Residual since a deregulated market should increase entry and, hence, lower the market shares of the incumbent lenders. 9 The first stage of the Two-Stage-Least-Squares IV-estimation model is the following
DREG is the reverse deregulation index from Rice and Strahan (2010) lagged by one year.
It ranges between zero (most restrictive states) and four (least restrictive states). In the second stage, we regress house price growth on the predicted BGR values from Equation (6).
Regarding the relevance assumption of the instrument, column (2) of Table 6 reports results for the first stage regression. We find that the deregulation index negatively and significantly affects the BGR. States that deregulated more have a lower BGR: more entry reduces the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on the aggregate economy because the market structure changes. The first stage F-statistic on the excluded instruments yields 13.80
(p-value = 0.0003), which is above the recommended F-statistic of 10 and diminshes worries about weak instruments.
The second stage regression in our analysis,
then uses the predicted values for the BGR from Equation (6), which should be free of any potential remaining endogenous variation. The corresponding results in column (1), Table   6 reveal that the part of the BGR that can be explained by branching deregulation has substantial explanatory power for house price growth between 1994 and 2005. In this setup, an increase of the BGR by one standard deviation leads to an economically meaningful mortgage demand would trigger deregulation. However, this seems unlikely since Favara and Imbs (2015) show that unaffected banks, due to their legal status such as independent mortgage lenders, thrifts or credit unions should have taken advantage of such hypothetical boom as well as depository institutions. In fact, they did not.
rise in house price growth by 113% of its standard deviation. 10 -Insert Table 6 hereOur IV analysis corroborates our previous results of a positive and significant effect of the BGR on house price growth. Regarding the relevance of our instrument, we provide evidence that the deregulation index has a significant impact on the BGR in a regression of Equation (6) Table 6 ). More importantly, we provide evidence that the significant impact of the instrument on the BGR vanishes in the first stage as shown in column (4) of Table 6 .
Moreover, the reduced form coefficient for the instrument is also insignificant (Column (5)), which indicates that there are no bypassing effects of the deregulation index on house price growth. We interpret this as affirmative for the exclusion restriction of our instrument. 12 10 This calculation is based on summary statistics of the IV regression sample with 243 MSAs between 1994-2005. 11 They analyze whether family size affects the performance of first borns, and use the occurrence of twins and the sex of the second borns as instruments. To show that the exclusion restriction holds they investigate their results for samples that include only never takers (highly educated women) or always takers (women from African ethnicity) as the instrument. They argue that for the exclusion restriction to hold the coefficients for the instruments in the first stage and in the reduced form must be insignificant.
12 We find the same results when we include states with an index between 0 and 2. If we further expand the sample to states with index values between 0 and 3, we find the same results as in column (1) and (2) of Table 6 .
Persistence of Granular Effects From the Mortgage Market
Since, so far, we only show the impact response of house price growth to idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks, we now investigate the dynamic responses to see how persistent is the effect of the BGR on house price growth. To make this plausible, we follow Favara and Imbs (2015) and use the local projection methodology by Jorda (2005) . It sequentially regresses house price growth shifted forward by one period on the BGR and on the control variables. The resulting impulse responses are based on a vector of estimates β i 1 at horizon i = 0, . . . , 6 collected from the baseline regression of Equation (4)
and from the IV panel regression of Equation (7) HP
Panel A of Figure 7 shows fairly persistent effects of the BGR on house price growth in the baseline regression. The effect peaks after 1-2 years, peters down and loses significance after four years. This result is attenuated by the impulse response function based on the IV specification.
-Insert Figure 7 herePanel B reveals that the granular effect on house price growth is less persistent over time.
The effect peaks directly after the shock and becomes insignificant after two years. These more conservative results seem to be in line with previous literature. For example, Favara and Imbs (2015) demonstrate that the response of house price growth to an exogenous common credit supply shock is long-lived since it fades out after five to six years. The focus on a common supply shock might justify the substantial magnitude of their estimated effect compared to our idiosyncratic shock measure. Since we investigate idiosyncratic supply shocks, the fading out of our IV regression effects after two years seems reasonable.
Conclusions
This paper highlights the importance of mortgage market concentration for the propagation of idiosyncratic bank events and their effect on house price growth. Our analysis of granular effects from the U.S. mortgage market yields four key findings. First, mortgage origination at the MSA-level is highly concentrated. The distribution of newly issued mortgages follows a fat-tailed power law, meaning that a small number of players dominate mortgage origination. Second, idiosyncratic mortgage supply shocks are a driver of house price growth. The larger the increase in mortgage supply due to bank-specific events is, the faster house prices grow. These results are robust to several alternative model specifications.
Third, we find that more inelastic housing supply aggravates the effect of bank-specific mortgage supply shocks on house prices. Fourth, the effect of idiosyncratic shocks at the regional level is rather short-lived when we consider our conservative instrumental variable regression results. We find that the granular effects from the mortgage market die out after two years. This augments the findings from previous literature that the impact of common shocks is very persistent.
The results are important for informing the debate on the treatment of large financial institutions, since we show that bank-specific shocks like financial innovations, fine payments, computer glitches, or unexpected managerial decisions happening to banks with large market shares have effects beyond the micro-level. The higher mortgage market concentration, the easier do micro-level events spread across housing markets. Hence, in addition to indicators like mortgage growth and loan-to-value ratios, macroprudential regulation should take market shares and mortgage market concentration into account when analyzing macroeconomic stability. Notes: This figure illustrates the sum of newly issued mortgages for the top 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 5% and 10% of banks aggregated at the U.S. level, as a fraction of total newly issued mortgages of all banks over the period 1990-2014. The total average number of banks each year is 7900 comprising both depository and non-depository institutions. The average number of banks in the top 10% is 800. The HMDA data cover 80% of bank home lending activity nationwide. Gabaix and Ibragimov (2011) , for each of the 345 MSAs we regress the log of banks' rank (based on newly issued mortgages) on the log of their newly issued mortgages. The resulting coefficient indicates whether the bank size distribution in each MSA market follows a fat-tailed power law. This is the case if the absolute value is below one. House price growth (1990-2014, average) Notes: This figure depicts the averaged Banking Granular Residual (upper subgraph) over the period 1990-2014 across all 345 MSAs in our sample and the average house price index growth (lower subgraph) over the same period for all MSAs in the sample. Notes: This table reports fixed effects regressions of the log change in house price index on the Banking Granular Residual (BGR). Column (1) is the baseline scenario with the following explanatory variables: the current and lagged log change in MSAs income per capita, population and employment. Column (2) interacts the BGR with the housing supply elasticity by Saiz (2010) . Column (3) introduces a crisis dummy that equals one for the period 2007-2009 and zero otherwise, plus an interaction with the BGR. Column (4) contains a MSA-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the volume of newly issued mortgage loans, both as single regressor and as an interaction term with the BGR. The sample of column (1) to (4) includes all U.S. metropolitan statistical areas for which mortgage and house price data is available for the period 1990-2014. All regressions include MSA and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the MSA-level, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Notes: This table presents fixed effects regressions of the log change in house price index on different specifications of the Banking Granular Residual (BGR). Regressors are the current and lagged log change in MSAs income per capita, population and employment. Column (1) repeats our baseline regression based on Equation 2. Banking Granular Residual 2 refers to a measure of the idiosyncratic shock which is computed with bank, bank-time, year, and MSA fixed effects. The BGR3 is based on shocks including only year, MSA and year-MSA fixed effects. For computing BGR4, idiosyncratic shocks are measured with bank, MSA, time, bank-time and MSA-time fixed effects. The sample includes all U.S. MSAs for which mortgage and house price data are available for the period 1990-2014. Also, regional and time fixed effects are incrementally included. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses and clustered at the MSA-level, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Rice and Strahan (2010) . The index ranges between zero and four whereas we reverse the index so that most restricted states get a zero and the least restrictive states a four. Column (1) and (2) display the second stage and first stage, respectively, of the 2SLS estimation based on the whole sample where the deregulation index is available. Column (3) and (4) represents the second and first stage, respectively, of the 2SLS regression based on a sample restricted to deregulation values ranging between zero and two. Column (5) demonstrates the reduced form of the regression of house price growth on the instrument. The sample of Columns (1) and (2) is restricted to 243 MSAs for the period 1994-2005 due to the availability of the deregulation index.
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